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SEPARATION RHETORIC AND ITS
RELEVANCE
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE. By Philip
Hamburger. 1 Harvard University Press. 2002. Pp. 514.
$49.95.
Adam M. Samaha 2

A degree of conventional constitutional interpretation is
backward-looking, sometimes even nostalgic. Adjudication demands innovation, of course. But fidelity to a reconstructed past
is an embedded interpretive value, which means that conclusions
about the complexion of our national heritage can have consequences for federal constitutional law. An apparent case in point
is establishment clause precedent and the rhetoric of churchstate "separation" -a slogan that Philip Hamburger seeks to vitiate in his latest work, Separation of Church and State.
This book alone places Professor Hamburger among the
most serious and industrious of the "separation" critics. By canvassing an impressive amount of primary source material, emphasizing public discourse, and exploring religious, political, and
social movements, Hamburger helps to explain what various
Americans thought about religion-government relations over
approximately two centuries. His ultimate conclusions about
"separation" are stark, yet also undergirded by something better
than the wishful thinking of a beholden advocate. The book has
and will receive attention from scholars and judges. 3
Separation's analysis of rhetoric, religion, and intolerance is
worth remembering for many reasons, but objections to its use in
I. John P. Wilson Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
2. Visiting Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School. Thanks to
Dan Farber, David Elsberg, Noah Feldman, Mike Paulsen, and Jaynie Leung, among
others. Mistakes are mine.
3. Though perhaps not always for the author's intended purposes. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2504-05, 2507 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing both
Hamburger and the separation metaphor favorably in arguing for doctrine that minimizes religious strife); see MarciA. Hamilton, "Separation": From Epithet ro Constitutional Norm, 88 Va. L. Rev. 1433 (2002) (book review).
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establishment clause adjudication are probably insurmountable.
The book's treatment of the founding era leaves open significant
issues germane to an originalist understanding, and the postFirst Amendment material is harrowing but mostly irrelevant to
present-day litigation. These observations are not necessarily
criticisms of what Hamburger has accomplished; perhaps he did
not intend to advocate any particular position on modern constitutional law. But of course authorial intent need not equate with
a text's received meaning at any subsequent reading. And, whatever the author's view, Separation's sources and conclusions may
pertain to contemporary constitutional disputes. This review
considers the book for that connection.
I. CONTEXT FOR AND THEMES IN SEPARATION

Church-state "separation" has been promoted by a variety
of Americans for a variety of purposes, as Hamburger documents. Every constitutional lawyer is aware of Thomas Jefferson's use of the metaphor: in 1802, President Jefferson drafted a
letter responding to the laments of a Connecticut Baptists association, in which he characterized the establishment clause as
"building a wall of separation between Church & State." (p. 161)
This word-image was vivid and potent, and Jefferson was neither
the first 4 nor the last to use it. Tocqueville attributed the concept
to Catholic interviewees in 1831-32. 5 Three decades later, P.T.
Barnum derided religious superstition while endorsing churchstate separation. 6 In 1875, President Grant picked U.f, the line in
opposing government funding for parochial schools. Many years
4. Mark DeWolfe Howe, The Garden and the Wilderness: Religion and Government in American Constitutional History 5-6 (U. of Chicago Press, 1965) (distinguishing
Roger Williams) sense of the image from Jefferson's); John Locke, A Letter Concerning
Toleration (1685), in 6 The Works of John Locke 21 (T. Davison, 1801) (advocating limits
on ecclesiastical power in civil affairs, particularly over liberty and property "upon the
account of' religious differences, using separationist terms: "the church itself is a thing
absolutely separate and distinct from the commonwealth. The boundaries on both sides
are fixed and immoveable."); see also Thomas Paine, Age of Reason (1794), in Thomas
Paine: Collected Writings 667 (Library Classics, 1995) (referring to "[t]he adulterous connection of church and state" that trenched upon open discussion of religious matters).
5. 1 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 308 (Vintage Books, 1990)
(1835) ("[T]hey differed upon matters of detail alone, and that they all attributed the
peaceful dominion of religion in their country mainly to the separation of church and
state. I do not hesitate to affirm that during my stay in America I did not meet a single
individual, of the clergy or the laity, who was not of the same opinion on this point.").
6. P.T. Barnum, The Humbugs of the World, Account of Humbugs, Delusions, Impositions, Quackeries, Deceits, and Deceivers Generally, in All Ages 415 (Carelton, 1866).
7. Anson P. Stokes and Leo Pfeffer, Church and State in the United States 433
(Greenwood Press, 1964) ("Leave the matter of religion to the family, altar, the church,
and the private school supported entirely by private contributions. Keep the church and
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later, Democratic presidential candidates AI Smith and Jack
Kennedy each professed their devotion to an "absolute" separation of church and state. 8 And in 1878 and again in 1947, the
United States Supreme Court quoted Jefferson's letter and elevated what may have been a popular slogan into an apparently
justiciable concept. 9
Importation of a separationist mind-set into federal constitutional law nevertheless was, and is, deeply troubling to many.
A chief concern has been that a separation principle produces
too many restraints on government action that redounds to the
benefit of religion, to a point where it indicates or dictates a
secular society hostile to religious liberty. Largely for that reason, Everson rivals Marbury among the opinions most vilified by
those who support the result reached.
Hamburger adds other objections. He concludes that "the
constitutional authority for separation is without historical foundation."10 (p. 481) It may not be entirely clear what brand of
church-state "separation" is being eliminated here, but the author does deny that it was a popular slogan or principle before
the First Amendment was ratified. The project is much more
ambitious than contributing to an understanding of the founding
generation, however. Separation also attempts to track American use of the metaphor during the fourteen decades between
Jefferson's letter and the decision in Everson. And it turns out
that many lesser-known proponents of church-state separation
are now far less reputable than even P.T. Barnum. So Hamburger's work not only cabins the historical roots of separation
rhetoric, it also taints them. His research places Jefferson's views
at the margins and associates subsequent adherents with bigotry,
usually of an anti-Catholic stripe; 11 with "theological liberals, especially anti-Christian 'secularists"'; and with a particular vision
of religion that emphasizes the individual over hierarchy and institutions. (pp. 10-11, 14-16) For Hamburger, then, church-state
separation might be a useful concept in some respects, but
state forever separate."). It is not clear whether Grant was one of Barnum's "sucker[s)."
8. AI Smith, Letter, Atlantic Monthly 728 (May, 1927); Transcript of Kennedy Talk
to Ministers and Questions and Answers, N.Y. Times 22 (Sept. 13, 1960).
9. Everson v. Board of Educ. of Ewing Township, 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (citing
Reynolds v. United States, 98 (8 Otto) 145, 164 (1878)).
10. Accord Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 106 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
see also Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 856 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
II. Cf. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 829 (2000) (plurality opinion of Thomas, J.)
(condemning tests for prohibited government aid that turn on whether a school is "pervasively sectarian": "This doctrine, born of bigotry, should be buried now.").
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"separation ought not be assumed to have any special legitimacy
as an early American and thus constitutional idea. On the contrary, precisely because of its history-both its lack of constitutional authority and its development in response to prejudicethe idea of separation should, at best, be viewed with suspicion."12 (p. 483)
To evaluate such claims about the historical or constitutional authority for "the idea of separation," we need to consider
the ways in which the author chose to examine the phrase in
question. Many methods were available, and there is certainly no
one "correct" way to study the history of an idea. But just as
surely, some approaches are more relevant to modern constitutional law than others. Separation does not directly defend its
relevance to today's lawsuits, which might not be the author's
concern. By isolating the book's method of study, however, we
can make our own judgments.
It seems that Hamburger's methods and sources contribute
to at least three perspectives on "separation of church and
state": (1) As rhetoric or slogan. Hamburger's analysis is plainly,
even primarily, about the history of separation rhetoric, its popularity, and the motives of its sloganeers. From this vantage,
"separation" is easy to see but probably least significant to constitutional law. (2) As concept or general principle. Also explored
is the general idea and rationale expressed by church-state
"separation." This conceptual angle is related but not identical
to the study of rhetoric and slogan-insofar as it is possible to
distinguish ideas and principles from their authors and adherents. General principles are perhaps more difficult to pin down
than are sloganeers, and general principles sometimes seem too
abstract to resolve concrete constitutional problems. But their
use in adjudication is apparent even if their clarity is not: to
elaborate constitutional text, courts often employ principles; and
these principles are commonly informed by historical sources
close to the time at which the text was adopted, by experience
since then, or by both. Separation therefore bears on this sort of
decision-making. (3) As program, rule, or agenda. Finally, segments of the book suggest more specific ramifications for a separation principle or concept. Granted, Hamburger does not issue
a discrete and programmatic definition of "separation," 13 which
12. See also Philip Hamburger, Separation and Interpretation, 18 J.L. & Pol. 7, 37
(2002) (calling for rejectionof the phrase).
13. Hamburger indicates that separation means some distinction between church
and state; often means elimination of laws supporting, instituting, "or otherwise
establishing" religion; and perhaps "point[s) to ... a distance, segregation, or absence of
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might be a function of his focus on rhetoric and concepts, or
simply vagueness on the part of those who employed the phrase.
Still, the book provides some information on the agenda of those
who by 1791 opposed existing state relationships with religion,
and those who thereafter touted "separation" as a matter of effective rhetoric or guiding principle.
II. REVIEW AND SUPPLEMENTAL THOUGHTS,
IN TWO CHRONOLOGICAL STAGES
The analysis below proceeds in two stages: up until the generation that ratified the First Amendment (which obviously can
inform originalist evaluations of that text), and then after (which
is not so plainly within the boundaries of conventional interpretive sources). A concluding section adds some broader comments on the relevance of Hamburger's account to today's constitutional law.
A. THE SETTING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

Separation's first principal question is "whether separation
was the religious liberty protected by the First Amendment," (p.
9) and the book begins by exploring the rhetorical (dis )use of the
phrase prior to ratification of the federal Bill of Rights. Here
Hamburger consults the written records of Christian "religious
dissenters" 14 and their opponents, primarily in America and
England. These sources provide fascinating examples of rhetoric
dating to the sixteenth century, and Hamburger does the curious
a favor by providing extensive quotations from surviving tracts.
On this matter, Separation's essential finding is that preAmendment religious dissenters rarely called for a "separation
of church and state" much less a "separation of religion and government." Instead, "separation" was a goal that dissenters were
occasionally and unfairly accused of seeking. For example, at the
end of the sixteenth century Richard Hooker alleged that English dissenters had implied the untenable principle "that the
Church and the Commonwealth are two both distinct and separate societies ... and the walles of separation between these two
lishing" religion; and perhaps "point[s] to ... a distance, segregation, or absence of contact between church and state. Rather than simply forbid civil laws respecting an establishment of religion [however defined], it has more ambitiously tended to prohibit contact between religious and civil institutions." (pp. 2-3)
14. This class is not formally defined. Hamburger does indicate that he is referring
to members of religious sects who opposed "state establishments," (p. 19) but that term is
not specified by an easy-to-locate set of attributes, either.
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must for ever be upheld." (p. 36) On this side of the Atlantic,
evangelical dissenters were sometimes indicted for proposing a
separation of all religion and government. This attack was
probably quite effective, assuming the audience believed that the
charge was accurate and that social order and civil government
depended on religion and a resulting morality. (p. 66) Secular
reason and government power might still skirt chaos absent the
fear of God, (p. 70) and so perhaps government had to be better
able to encourage religious exercise than the dissenters' views
might permit (p. 71 n.7).
This is not to say that church-state integration was a popular
concept. Assorted dissenters in Europe and America attacked
the "union" of church and state as an adulterous corruption of
the former. (p. 55) Similarly, Hamburger contends that proestablishment ministers resented the accusation that church and
state had been "united" or "blended," defending the status quo
as an acceptable alliance or affiliation between distinct institutions. (pp. 65, 72-73) Defenders of official churches like Hooker
could accept distinctions between church and commonwealth,
between ecclesiastical and secular affairs, while at the same time
disparaging complete severance of the faithful from the citizenry. (p. 37) Indeed, these general principles are not far removed from how Separation describes the position of establishment assailants. Dissenters themselves saw critical connections
among vibrant religious practice, widespread morality, and a
functioning state; and Hamburger emphasizes that they avoided
rhetoric disparaging civil-religious connections or supporting
church-state separation. (pp. 73-75, 78) Of course these dissenters opposed "establishments" by definition, and some were concerned about clerical involvement in politics. (p. 83) Still, they
did not reject a moral or religious foundation for law. (pp. 76-78)
They may have "avoided convoluted distinctions about the permissible degree or type of connection between religion and government," but they "had every reason to seek religious liberty
and no reason to demand the disconnection of religion and government." (p. 78)
In important respects, then, Hamburger attributes to both
establishment ministers and religious dissenters similar conceptions of church-state and religion-government relations. True,
certain strains of Christian thought during the sixteenth through
eighteenth centuries indicate yearnings for detachment from the
wilderness of an impure world and government, or even from
other religious creeds (pp. 21-32, 38-52); and there were a few
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more secular, fringe critics of the clergy and institutional religion
(pp. 53, 59-62). Yet Hamburger cannot find strong evidence that
dissenters (or much of anyone) advocated segregation of religion
and government or repudiated a relationship of mutual support.
(p. 23) Rather, dissenting Protestants "left open the possibility of
other, nonestablishment connections." (p. 28)
At this juncture, attention to programmatics might be required if we want to convert these rhetorical and conceptual
findings into constitutional lessons. 15 If, as matters of general
principle, dissenters supported "distinctions" and opposed "union" or "establishment" yet refrained from demanding "separation" and could accept "nonestablishment connections," precisely what was their practical, affirmative vision for
government-religion relations? Did they have one? Separation's
discussion leaves doubts. Even on the implausible assumption
that America's religious dissenters spoke with one voice, serious
uncertainty about the operational meaning of their antiestablishment arguments would persist if they "avoided convoluted distinctions about the permissible degree or type of connection between religion and government." (p. 78) Those distinctions constitute the constitutional issues that have taunted
the courts for decades.
Constructively, Hamburger puts forward a counter-principle
promoted by dissenters: some form of "religious liberty" different from "separation." (p. 89) But both terms need additional
content before they become mutually exclusive; and a disjunction is perhaps more difficult because, as Hamburger observes,
official punishment for religious difference was largely abandoned in America by the late 1700s. (pp. 89-90) Dissenters were
likely most concerned with government benefits, privileges, and
protections.
Assuming it is desirable to assemble a more specific program of state-level legal reform that religious dissenters did or
15. Some might search only for general principle here, but I am not convinced that
this can yield much guidance for constitutional law. In any event, identifying specific historical controversies is plainly one way to inform principle. See Douglas Laycock, "Noncoercive" Support for Religion: Another False Claim About the Establishment Clause, 26
Val. U. L. Rev. 37, 49-50 (1991) ("Noncoercive"). More programmatic inquiries, like the
state of state establishments or alternative legal regimes proposed by dissenters, are
hardly incontestable; but that might be cause for downgrading the role of both in constitutional adjudication. Cf. Philip B. Kurland, The Origins of the Religion Clauses of the
Constitution, 27 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 839, 842 (1986) ("History ordinarily should not be
expected, however, to provide specific answers to the specific problems that bedevil the
Court.").
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would endorse, what sources are available? Identifying a negative agenda is probably easiest. The specifics of state laws directed at religion, and their actual operation, help define what
religious dissenters opposed- although not necessarily why or
exactly what was objectionable. Separation does not dwell on the
details of the challenged "establishments," however, which were
not all of a piece. 16 Hamburger does helpfully single out as dissenter priorities their opposition to taxes for ministers' salaries,
and to exclusive rights to conduct legal marriages in a preferred
class of clergy. (p. 90) Even if Separation had departed from its
primary themes to give more details, though, additional information would be needed to determine what if any alternative program could have existed. Eliminating "establishment" is not a
precise conclusion, even if we had a working definition of it. For
example, two different ways to eliminate a system of government-sponsored benefits for only favored religious sects are (1)
abolition of the benefits, or (2) extension to those excluded.
Separation suggests some other building blocks for a dissenter program of religion-government relations; but the contours are somewhat fuzzy. For instance, Hamburger helps specify dissenter demands for state constitutional amendments
regarding "religious liberty" by categorizing them under two
sub-principles: equal rights- "a freedom from laws that discriminated on the basis of religious differences"; and no legislation cognizant of religion-"a request that law take no notice of
religion," which was "an approach that denied civil government
any jurisdiction over religion." (pp. 94, 100) How these ideas differed from possible versions of "separation" is not clear, nor is
there much certainty about how these counter-principles play
out in live controversies. One extension is the thought that few
religious dissenters disavowed all government-derived benefits:
many supported government recognition for their marriage rituals and protection of religious property; some others endorsed
legislative exemptions from secular demands for minorities like
Quakers. (pp. 90, 93, 101, 107) In addition, some founding era
state constitutions prohibited compelled worship and payments
for the support of clergy or churches. 17 Hamburger calls them
16. For additional specifics and perspectives, see, for example, Gerard V. Bradley,
Church·State Relationships in America ch. 2 (Greenwood Press, 1987), Thomas J. Curry,
The First Freedoms: Church and State in America to the Passage of the First Amendment
chs. 5·7 (Oxford, 1986), and Anson P. Stokes, 1 Church and State in the United States ch.
5 (Harper, 1950).
17. These clauses came in several forms. E.g., N.J. Const. art. XVIII (1776), re·
printed in Francis N. Thorpe, cd., 5 The Federal and State Constitutions: Colonial Char·

2002]

BOOK REVIEWS

721

departures from the "standard pattern of antiestablishment demands" and parallel to free-exercise based rights against compulsion. (p. 94 n.10) On the other hand, we cannot ignore their
apparent tension with, for example, sect-neutral but tax-financed
or government-prompted religious worship. 18
To confidently conclude that the founders rejected separation as a proper principle or resulting program, one must confront another concrete issue: the state practice of excluding
clergy from holding certain offices in government- certainly a
conceivable plank in a separation platform. (pp. 184-85) Hamburger does so. He reports that he found no sound evidence that,
during the founding era, such exclusions were justified with reference to separation of church and state or of religion and government. (p. 79) To the contrary, he points out that Massachusetts and South Carolina, which officially supported preferred
religions, also maintained such exclusions; that dissenters usually
ignored the question; and that the exclusions were supported by
ters, and Other Organic Laws of the States, Territories, and Colonies Now or Heretofore
Forming the United States of America 2597 (Government Printing Office, 1909); Pa.
Const. art. IX, § 3 (1790) ("[N]o man can of right be compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry, against his consent; that no human
authority can, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience .... "), reprinted in Thorpe, 5 Federal and State Constitutions at 3100; cf. Ga.
Const. art. IV, § 5 (1789) ("All persons shall have the free exercise of religion, without
being obliged to contribute to the support of any religious profession but their own.")
(emphasis added), reprinted in Thorpe, 2 Federal and State Constitutions at 789; Vt. Declaration of Rights art. III (1787) ("[N]o man ought, or of right can be compelled to attend
any religious worship, or erect or support any place of worship, or maintain any minister,
contrary to the dictates of his conscience ... Nevertheless, every sect or denomination of
Christians ought to observe the Sabbath or Lord's day, and keep up some sort of religious worship, which to them shall seem most agreeable to the revealed will of God.")
(emphasis added), reprinted in Thorpe, 6 Federal and State Constitutions at 3752. These
provisions and others can be browsed at 1st Amendment Online, <httpJ/lstam.umn.edu>.
18. See also Laycock, Noncoercive at 47 (cited in note 15) (arguing that, in Virginia
and Maryland, "[s]tate assistance to churches was rejected as an establishment, even with
the right to designate the recipient of the tax, ... and in Maryland, to escape the tax altogether by declaring nonbelief'). Hamburger makes the intriguing suggestion that New
York and South Carolina "prohibited an establishment by" adding sect-neutral free exercise clauses. (p. 99 & n.20) (emphasis added) South Carolina does appear to have
eliminated its declaration that Protestantism was the state's "established" religion at the
same time that it adopted a broader free exercise guarantee. See S.C. Const. art.
XXXVIII (1778), reprinted in Thorpe, 6 Federal and State Constitutions at 3255-57 (cited
in note 17); S.C. Canst. art. VIII (1790), reprinted in Thorpe, 6 Federal and State Constitutions at 3264 (cited in note 17); Stokes, 1 Church and State in the United States at 434
(cited in note 16). New York's situation is less amenable to the description, however. See
Stokes, 1 Church and State in the United States at 405-06 (cited in note 17). That state's
federal constitutional ratifying convention also indicated independent meaning for free
exercise and antiestablishment clauses: the convention declared both principles when
they ratified the Federal Constitution. (p. 99 n.21); Edward Dumbauld, The Bill of Rights
and What It Means Today 189 (U. of Oklahoma Press, 1957).
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a variety of ideas about the proper role of clergy and civil magistrates, perhaps even anti-Catholic bias. (pp. 79-83, 87) Yet the
exclusions probably deserve greater weight than Separation
gives, inasmuch as the book's mission is to study something
other than rhetoric. 19 Regardless of the arguments audibly
voiced in their favor, these bars were common at the time the
First Amendment was drafted and ratified. Indeed, Hamburger
asserts that ministerial exclusions "were often paired with exemptions from civil obligations, such as the obligation to pay
taxes or serve in the military," (p. 84) which are likewise potential components of a separation program. Regardless, the critics
failed to eliminate ministerial exclusions, whatever force the
separation accusation had, however attractive was Noah Webster's message that "[r]eligion and policy ought ever to go hand
in hand," (p. 88) whatever the tensions with then-prevailing notions of free exercise, and however irrelevant this history is to
contemporary constitutionallaw. 20
Having emphasized state-level dissent, Separation briefly
recounts the drafting history of the First Amendment to the
Federal Constitution. Hamburger begins with the plausible point
that religious dissenters would have been skeptical of any provision that might prohibit legislatures from protecting the free exercise of religion. (pp. 106-07) We should be careful, therefore,
not to over-read demands that government not take "cognizance" of religion. 21 (p. 102) In any event, Hamburger contends,
an unqualified no-cognizance standard was not what Madison
proposed in his first draft of amendments to the Federal Constitution on June 8, 1789, 22 nor what Congress referred and the
19. This broader mission seems apparent. For example, Hamburger looks beyond
slogans in confining the meaning of attacks on the status quo. Locke once described the
church as "a thing absolutely separate and distinct from the commonwealth," which
Hamburger characterizes as "merely an expression of his pervasive and hardly original
argument about the difference between religious and civil jurisdiction." (p. 54) In 1767,
Britain's James Burgh asked future generations to "[b)uild an impenetrable wall of separation between things sacred and civil," which Hamburger asserts "came close" to a wall
of separation between church and state. (p. 57) Paine likewise "came close" in Age of
Reason, (p. 60) which Hamburger asserts "did not necessarily refer to all types of churchstate connections" in its condemnation of "adulterous connection" (p. 62).
20. See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
21. This was a principle that Madison used in drafting the famous Memorial and
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments in Virginia. Everson v. Board of Educ. of
Ewing Township, 330 U.S. 1, 64 (1947) (appendix) ("We maintain therefore that in matters of Religion, no man's right is abridged by the institution of Civil Society, and that
Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance.").
22. See 1 Journal of the House of Representatives of the United States at the First
Session of the First Congress at 46 (Gales & Seaton, 1826) (June 8, 1789); Bernard
Schwartz, The Great Rights of Mankind: A History of the American Bill of Rights 202
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state legislatures ratified. (p. 105) Indeed the House of Representatives ultimately rejected a version of the religion clauses
that would have stated, "Congress shall make no laws touching
religion or [infringing?] the rights of conscience." 23 Hamburger
concludes that "Madison reconciled himself to language less
sweeping than that he had used in 1785 [in Virginia], and Congress adopted a moderated version of the no-cognizance standard, which did not forbid all legislation respecting religion." (p.
107)
The drafting history of the religion clauses may be a sidelight for Separation, and this essay is not the place for a comprehensive rendition of that process. But the topic is sufficiently important to warrant some additions to the record. While the text
ratified by the states "said nothing about separation," (id.) neither did it use the words "religious liberty," "coercion," "neutrality," "sect preferences," "accommodation," or a variety of
other phrasings that might or might not have provided additional
guidance for constitutional interpretation. In fact, it appears that
no state constitution of that era nor any amendment recommended by a state ratifying convention employed the precise
terminology ultimately ratified as our First Amendment. 24
Moreover, Congress dispensed with several drafts regarding religion before the members reached agreement. In addition to rejecting Madison's first draft and one referring to laws "touching"
religion, Congress also set aside an establishment clause that
would have confirmed that it lacked authority to make law es(Madison House, 1977).
23. According to the collection cited by Hamburger on this point-Helen E. Veit,
et al., eds., Creating the Bill of Rights: The Documentary Record from the First Federal
Congress (Johns Hopkins U. Press, 1991)-one of three sources for this proposal includes
the word "infringing." Id at 150, 153, 158 (quoting The Daily Advertiser, The Gazette of
the United States, and The Congressional Register); see also 1 Annals of Congress 759
(Gales & Seaton, 1834) (Aug. 15, 1789). According to another of those sources, Representative Sam Livermore, who proposed this language, apparently did not intend a substantive change from the text that it replaced ("no religion shall be established by law,
nor shall the equal rights of conscience be infringed"). Veit, Creating the Bill of Rights at
150-51. In any case, the language referred to the Senate was: "Congress shall make no
law establishing religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, nor shall the rights of
Conscience be infringed." Schwartz, The Great Rights of Mankind at 240 (cited in note
22).
24. Cf., e.g., N.J. Const. art. XIX (1776) ("That there shall be no establishment of
any one religious sect in this Province, in preference to another .... ") (emphasis added),
reprinted in Thorpe, 5 Federal and State Constitutions at 2597 (cited in note 17); Dumbauld, The Bill of Rights at 189 (cited in note 18) (reprinting New York's declarations
and recommended amendments of July 26, 1788: the delegates "Do declare and make
known .... that no Religious Sect or Society ought to be favoured or established by Law
in preference of others") (emphasis added).
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tablishing "one religious sect or society in preference to others,"25 as well as the Senate's final draft: "Congress shall make
no law establishing articles of faith, or a mode of worship. "26
Whether the congressional drafters rejected such alternative
language because they wanted a meaning broader, or otherwise
different, or because of stylistic or other reasons-or whether
any other relevant cohort of Americans understood the text in
the same way-is subject to fair and perhaps irreconcilable differences of opinion. But there is a sound argument that the
drafting history and meaning of the federal establishment clause
were unique? 7
There is also substantial reason to believe that the federal
clause was uniquely restrictive. The institution of a new central
government raised acute concerns about the scope of its authority, and the constitutional amendments pressed by Madison and
others during the very first Congress were a response to them. 28
So why would founding era criticism of state-level relationships
between government and religion round out concerns about such
national government relationships? 29 Even some opponents of
"separation" might agree that the importance of decentralized
power at that time supports at least one distinct limitation that
had no state-side analogue: preventing the national legislature
from diSestablishing locally and officially preferred faiths-in
that sense, "mak[ing]" a "law respecting an establishment of religion. " 30 Hamburger mentions and disagrees with the opinion of
some that the clause should be interpreted to restrict only the
25. 1 Journal of the First Session of the Senate of the United States of America 70
(Gales & Seaton, 1820) (Sept. 3, 1789). It is well known that Madison tried but failed to
include additional express limitations on state government power, including protection
for "the equal rights of conscience." Schwartz, The Great Rights of Mankind at 177, 20203 (cited in note 22). The House agreed to language similar to Madison's, but the Senate
balked. Id at 240, 242-44; 1 Journal of the Senate 72 (Sept. 7, 1789) (rejecting House article 14).
26. Schwartz, The Great Rights of Mankind at 242 (cited in note 22); 1 Journal of
the Senate 77 (Sept. 9, 1789) (cited in note 25).
27. For additional detail on establishment clause drafting history, see, for example,
Douglas Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent, 27 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 875 (1986).
28. See, e.g., 1 Journal of the Senate 73 (Sept. 8, 1789) (cited in note 25) (preamble
to the congressional resolution referring amendments to the state legislatures).
29. For one rather severe version of this line of argument, see Leonard W. Levy,
The Establishment Clause: Religion and the First Amendment 89, 121-22 (U. of North
Carolina Press, 1986). See also DanielL. Dreisbach and John D. Whaley, What the Wall
Separates: A Debate on Thomas Jefferson's "Wall of Separation" Metaphor, 16 Canst.
Comm. 627, 649-54 (1999) (collecting sources).
30. U.S. Canst., Amend. I (emphasis added); see Michael A. Paulsen, Religion,
Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause
Adjudication, 61 Notre Dame L. Rev. 311, 321 (1986).
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federal government's ability to interfere with state establishments, (p. 106 n.40) but he does not address the possibility that
the clause must be interpreted differently from analogous state
constitutional provisions or the agenda of dissenters from state
regimes.
Separation's attention to religious dissenters and their statelevel battles in pre-Amendment America is one legitimate
method for beginning to reconstruct constitutionally relevant
history. Yet a complete investigation into the original meaning
or intent of the establishment clause should answer more questions-whether dissenter positions are fairly ascertainable, differed from any useful definition of separation principles or programs, and are an appropriate proxy for establishment clause
meaning.
B. THE POST-TEXT RISE OF SEPARATION RHETORIC

Doubts about whether Separation is apposite to modern
constitutional law escalate when one turns to its review of postratification separation rhetoric. The story is enticing, illuminating, and depressing. But it raises disturbing possibilities if employed as a backlight to contemporary constitutional adjudication.
According to Hamburger, separation slogans were first
popularly used by Jefferson's political supporters during the
1800 presidential campaign. Far from any high-minded principle,
these phrases were rhetorical tools for attracting antiestablishment voters while simultaneously chastening proFederalist clergy for their intervention into a partisan political
campaign. (p. 111) Certain religious leaders had vocally and vigorously opposed Jefferson's election, assaulting him as a nonChristian infidel who might undermine religion and morality in
America. (pp. 112-14) As one reverend reasoned, because the
Federal Constitution did not foreclose the election of "a manifest enemy to the religion of Christ, in a Christian nation," voting was the only way to close the door. (p. 116) Perhaps struggling to defend Jefferson's prior writings indicating an
individual's right to declare the nonexistence of God and that
the Bible was an inappropriate teaching tool for the schools (pp.
116, 119), his supporters sometimes shot back in blunderbuss
fashion. Aside from denials, some publicly demanded disconnection of religion and politics-something that Republicans did not
necessarily practice themselves (pp. 140-43)-and suggested that
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their opponents supported an actual union of church and state
(p. 120).
Apparently, "the Republican demand for a separation of religion and government ... resonated among the people," and
pro-Federalist ministers discontinued such sermons sometime
after the election. (p. 129) Not long after, Jefferson used separation to explicate the First Amendment, which Hamburger associates with the then-President's now-developed fear of clerical
tyranny over the individual mind and the clergy's unhealthy
propagation of entrenched custom. (pp. 147-49) Separation does
not quite explain how separation rhetoric could be perceived by
Republicans as appropriate and effective in 1800 and yet still
have been a poignant accusation a decade earlier. But the book
does note an interesting intersection of politics, religion, and
rhetoric.
If campaign strategy helped vault separation into popular
discourse, Hamburger's explanation for its subsequent staying
power is more disturbing. No doubt some were honestly concerned that traditional religious hierarchies and mores were inhibiting human progress through reason, science, and the secular
arts. (pp. 132-36) But Hamburger views this justification for
"separation" as a minority position that cannot adequately explain its rise. Too many Americans accepted interconnections of
religion, morality, and government. (p. 189) Instead, Separation
posits the confluence of three trends: not just (1) skepticism of
organized or hierarchical religion, but also (2) the growing force
of anti-Catholic nativists, and (3) a generalized movement toward specialization, division of labor, and segregation of American life, which tended to isolate the influence of religion within a
private sphere. (pp. 14-16, 252, 265) Although the relative importance of each factor is difficult to judge,_ Hamburger maintains that "the separation of church and state became popular
mostly as an anti-Catholic and more broadly antiecclesiastical
conception of religious liberty." (p. 252)
The 1830s through the 1850s are pivotal decades for Separation. They are portrayed as the time at which church-state "separation" became an acceptable and even popular goal. Because
fears about the influence of clergy or organized religion were
pronounced with regard to Catholics-who some believed acted
on remote control from Rome (pp. 203-05, 234-35, 237 n.llO)Protestant clergy had an opportunity to redirect individualismbased complaints to the Catholic Church. (p. 201) Some Protestants perceived (or at least portrayed) Catholicism as an institu-
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tion that inherently burdened freedom of thought, freedom of
conscience, and individualism in preference to hierarchy, topdown dictates, and tradition-bound superstition. 31 (pp. 204-05) In
this way, Catholicism might conflict with an evolution of Protestantism to emphasize personal faith, (pp. 203-04) as well as the
felt preconditions for America's democracy. Regardless, Hamburger's conclusions permit us to characterize 1800s separationism as a theologically rooted concept-in fact, partly founded on
sect-based bigotry.
One mid-century example of separation's apparent public
acceptance occurred during an otherwise well-known 1840 debate over school funding. In New York City, government funding was forbidden to all sectarian schools, yet the schools receiving the money were hardly secular: they required readings from
the King James version of the Bible and some of their textbooks
were unfriendly to Catholicism. 32 (pp. 219-20, 223 n.83) Although the Public School Society ultimately offered to delete
certain anti-Catholic textbook passages, (p. 223) that body and
its allies also opposed funding for Catholic schools on the general principles of church-state separation and voluntary support
for religion (p. 222). Hamburger helps explain this apparent contradiction by pointing to a Protestant conception of Catholicism
as an institutional and hierarchical church, while Protestantism
operated through individuals. A Protestant audience might well
conclude that calls for separation of "church" and state referred
only to the Catholic Church. This context and other "code
words" (p. 222) indicate that an important part of the New York
opposition to private school funding was opposition to Catholicism.

3 I. That Catholicism was also the religion of many new immigrants did not augur
well for tolerance, either. (p. 202) Certain Catholic leaders fed such fears, however, by
advocating world conversion, overt intolerance for other faiths, and organized political
participation as bloc voters. (pp. 209-10, 227) Hamburger notes that Pope Gregory XVI
deepened the political vulnerabilities in the United States when, in 1832, he not only denounced separation of church and state and lauded their union, but also challenged modern liberty of conscience, opinion, and the press. (pp. 230-32 & n.96); see also John C.
Jeffries, Jr. and James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100 Mich.
L. Rev. 279, 302-03 (2001); Marc D. Stern, School Vouchers- The Church-State Debate
that Really Isn't, 31 Conn. L. Rev. 977, 987 (1999) ("(T]wentieth century Americans make
the mistake of measuring the import of that anti-Catholic response against the postVatican II Catholic Church .... ").
32. See also Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2503 (2002) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) ("When it decided these 20th century Establishment Clause cases, the Court
d1d not deny that an earlier American society might have found a less clear-cut
church/state separation compatible with social tranquility.").
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The parallel ascendance of nativist politics and separation
rhetoric is confirmed in the later half of the nineteenth century.
In the 1870s and 1880s, as Hamburger describes it, "antiChristian" secularists sought relatively broad federal constitutional amendments separating government from religious organizations or creeds. (pp. 287-90, 294-97, 314) These secular
liberals were essentially equal-opportunity skeptics who feared
the influence of religion writ large. 33 But their agenda was overrun. An intersecting movement for "separation" was sectdiscriminatory in motive and strategy, drawing support from
those who drew lines between "real" Americans and the Catholic Church. Accordingly, another amendment was offered by
Republican presidential aspirant James G. Blaine in the wake of
President Grant's call. (pp. 297-98, 322-25) Rather than addressing all aspects of government-religion relations, it targeted state
funding for parochial schools. That focus could join the interests
of secular liberals and anti-Catholic nativists. (pp. 324-25) While
both efforts to amend the Federal Constitution failed, the Protestant-Republican-anti-Catholic movement, which also traveled
under the banner of separation, was the more popular. (p. 321)
The secularist effort ultimately imploded, (pp. 330-31) yet
Blaine-like amendments were adopted in a majority of the states
by 189034 and the Republican, Democratic, and Prohibition Parties expressed support for church-state separation. (pp. 324, 326
& n.102)
Blaine's proposal has always been a facially inconvenient
fact for those who want to remain faithful to original meaning
while still enforcing First Amendment limits against state action
through the Fourteenth-especially if the establishment clause is
to be read broadly enough to inhibit government financing of
parochial schools. Why was more constitutional text offered if
the old document already accomplished the goal? It turns out,
though, that the issue is not very straightforward, and Separation
indirectly helps to confirm that. Like the drafting history of the
First Amendment, this subject is partly outside the scope of
Hamburger's analysis. Nevertheless, his coverage of nineteenth
century constitutional movements generates thoughts about Article V failures.
33. Their specific agenda included eliminating religious tax exemptions and other
government benefits, prohibiting clerical involvement in political questions, and repealing religiously motivated Sunday laws. (pp. 304-05, 308-09)
34. Steven K. Green, The Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, 36 Am. J.L. Hist. 38,43
(1992).
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First of all, one may simply conclude that the best answer to
the same debatable constitutional question can be different in a
different era, after historical sources and received wisdom are
"examined in the crucible of litigation. "35 Putting that option
aside, it is also possible for failed amendment proponents to see
a need for new text that isn't there, or to seek additions out of
uncertainty and caution (at least if there is no ex ante rule that
estops subsequent litigation after an Article V defeat). 36 Many
constitutional clauses, including some in the Fourteenth and
First Amendments, do not evince specificity as their highest
value; and there is no instruction manual for interpreting the
Constitution. Furthermore, unless we concede judicial infallibility on constitutional questions, then Article V can be used to
seek correction of court error-for example, an erroneously narrow reading of the Fourteenth Amendment. 37 Just because the
corrective was unsuccessful, which might be for any number of
reasons, does not mean that the judiciary was right all along or
that it has no business self-correcting thereafter. Furthermore, as
Separation's emphasis on extra-judicial social movements helps
to suggest, there are other reasons to promote a constitutional
amendment than changing a constitution. Stirring up controversy
and animus is a perfectly understandable goal for any good nativist, and a constitutional campaign can be a good vehicle for
doing so.
Consider as well that Blaine's proposal as amended and
passed in the House was not the same text that was narrowly defeated in the Senate. The successful House version restated the
religion clauses of the First Amendment, prefaced by "No State
shall make any law," and then added a relatively specific prohibition regarding religious sects and state support for public
schools. 38 The failed Senate version included several additional
35. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,52 (1985).
36. Hamburger argues that, in fact, these amendment proponents believed that the
same result could not be achieved through litigation and legitimate interpretation, (pp.
435-38) but Separation itself notes that some who advocated a robust separation pointed
to constitutional norms, or maintained that their amendment proposals converted justified inferences into explicit constitutional declarations (pp. 223, 236, 240 n.114, 246-47,
275 n.11, 301-02 & n.36).
37. Cf. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 721-27 (1999) (spinning yams about the Eleventh Amendment). Hamburger asserts that there is no evidence that post-Fourteenth
Amendment proposals like Blaine's were drafted in response to the Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872), but Green, while noting some contrary statements, advises us to
consider that Congress' attention was on "the School Question" rather than the proper
mterpretatwn of the Fourteenth Amendment. Green, 36 Am. J.L. Hist. at 68-69 (cited in
note 34).
38. Blaine's version read: "[N]o money raised by taxation in any State for the sup-
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restraints, and also a caveat. In part it stated, "And no such particular creed or tenets shall be read or taught in any school or institution supported in whole or in part by such revenue or loan
of credit .... This article shall not be construed to prohibit the
reading of the Bible in any school or institution. "39 That caveat
closely aligns the proposal with the nativist-ProtestantRepublican agenda that Hamburger elucidates. On the other
hand, such particularities underscore the peculiar character of
the proposal under consideration and the range of reasons any
one member of Congress might have opposed it. Finally,
Blaine's and the Liberals' proposals were not the only notable
amendment movements that fell short during this period. The
National Reform Association, as Hamburger notes, pushed for
an amendment to the preamble which would have declared
America's Christianity. 40 (pp. 291-93, 326 n.101) Insofar as any
port of public schools, or derived from any public fund therefor, nor any public lands devoted thereto, shall ever be under the control of any religious sect, nor shall any money
so raised or lands so devoted be divided between religious sects or denominations."
Stokes and Pfeffer, Church and State in the United States at 434 (cited in note 7) (quoting
44th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 Cong. Rec. 205 (1875)). The House Judiciary Committee added
language which, unlike the Fourteenth Amendment, left Congress without explicit authority to enforce the proposal: "This article shall not vest, enlarge, or diminish legislative power in the Congress." Green, 36 Am. J.L. Hist. at 58 (cited in note 34) (quoting
44th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 Cong. Rec. 5189 (1876)).
39. The full text read:
No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; and no religious test shall ever be required
as a qualification to any office or public trust under any State. No public
property and no public revenue of, nor any loan of credit by or under the
authority of, the United States, or any State, Territory, District, or municipal
corporation, shall be appropriated to or made or used for the support of any
school, educational or other institution under the control of any religious or
anti-religious sect, organization, or denomination, or wherein .the particular
creed or tenets of any religious or anti-religious sect, organization, or
denomination shall be taught. And no such particular creed or tenets shall be
read or taught in any school or institution supported in whole or in part by such
revenue or loan of credit; and no such appropriation or loan of credit shall be
made to any religious or anti-religious sect, organization, or denomination, or to
promote its interests or tenets. This article shall not be construed to prohibit the
reading of the Bible in any school or institution; and it shall not have the effect
to impair rights of property already vested.
Stokes and Pfeffer, Church and State in the United States at 434 (cited in note 7) (quoting
44th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 Cong. Rec. 5453, 5595 (1876)); see also Green, 36 Am. J.L. Hist.
at 61 (cited in note 34) ("Apparently, members of the [Senate Judiciary Committee] were
impressed with the [caveat) because it allowed the Senators to have it both ways .... ");
Stokes, 2 Church and State in the United States at 723-28 (cited in note 16).
40. See also Isaac Kramnick and R. Laurence Moore, The Godless Constitution:
The Case Against Religious Correctness 148-49 (Norton, 1996) (contending that the Federal Constitution's secular character is partly confirmed by the failure of such amendment efforts); Stokes, 2 Church and State in the United States at 260 (cited in note 16); 3
id., at 587-88 (noting an unsuccessful 1888 proposal that would have mandated free public schools with education "in virtue, morality, and the principles of the Christian religion").
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rejected amendment may be used to construe constitutional text
left intact, there are several rational inferences that might be
drawn here.
The final chapters of Separation are the grimmest. They
cover the closing years of the 1800s through Everson, and they
link an emboldened and bigoted nativism with a popular penchant for separation slogans. (pp. 342, 352-54, 359, 366-68, 391)
Hamburger notes some doubts among religionists regarding the
possible negative effect of a separation principle on morality and
social accountability, (p. 389) and that different proponents had
different understandings about just what separation meant; but
he finds substantial support for separation as a constitutional
norm in the era leading up to Everson. By the early twentieth
century a bevy of groups and writers saw separation as "an
'American' constitutional right," (p. 391) part of a set of individually oriented and nationwide liberties that could not be limited to any one level of government (pp. 434-35, 448-49). The
Court, therefore, applied the clauses of the First Amendment to
the states within the "cultural circumstances created by nativism." (p. 448)
However, Hamburger argues, a significant component of
that popular support can be traced to movements with which few
present-day Americans would proudly associate: "the modern
myth of separation omits any discussion of nativist sentiment in
America and, above all, omits any mention of the Ku Klux Klan.
Yet nativists ... continued to distinguish themselves as the leading proponents of this ideal." (p. 399) In one version of the Klan
oath, new members dedicated themselves not only to free public
schools and free speech, but also to white supremacy and separation of church and state. (p. 409) They may have endorsed Bible
readings in public schools as well, (p. 410 n.46) but they certainly
opposed any influence of the Catholic Church on American life.
The Klan is all the more important to Hamburger's connection
of separation and bigotry, because the author of Everson, Justice
Hugo Black, was affiliated with the organization during his rise
to political prominence in Alabama. 41 (p. 423) "A Baptist, Black
opposed the consumption of alcohol and harbored deep suspicions of Catholicism." (Id.) Black apparently delivered the oath

41.

Two excuses for Black's membership are political expedience and local-juror
neither of which demonstrate the sort of personal risk-taking that helps de·
fme modern heroes. Nor do they differentiate Justice Black from many who have both
made serious mistakes and serious contributions to legal progress.
~ersuasion,
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about white supremacy and separation to entering Klansmen. (p.
426)

Which brings us to Separation's punch line. Hamburger recounts Everson as a case instigated by anti-Catholic nativists,
(pp. 455-57) authored by an ex-Klansman, and best understood
as a Pyrrhic victory for Catholics and others opposing separation
and seeking government benefits (pp. 461-63)."2 Having weathered criticism for his Klan membership at the outset of his judicial career, the case can be viewed as a double-sided opportunity
for Justice Black, part legal and part public relations: "Black expected that his disarming conclusion would lead Catholics to
think that they had succeeded in staving off the practical consequences of separation. The justice, however, knew better .... "
(p. 462) All nine members of the Court concurred in a separation principle, and its potential bite was indicated a year later in
McCollum. 43 Justice Black again wrote for the majority, which
persisted in employing a church-state separation principlealthough this time in a way that rolled back access to public
school students for a variety of religious instructors, not just
Catholics. The McCollum litigation thus ended with the first successful establishment clause objection in Supreme Court history,
but the Court had gone "far beyond the Protestant version of
separation of church and state" to "a relatively secular version."
(pp. 476-77)
By the middle of the twentieth century, then, Americans
saw separation "as their historic religious liberty, as a fundamental American freedom, and even as a constitutional right protected by the First Amendment." (p. 479)
III. SEPARATION AND ITS RELEVANCE
Despite the critique and supplemental analysis provided
above, Separation's primary themes are essentially intact. Sepa42. Hamburger also calls Justice Frankfurter "[a] secularized Jew" with "a distinct
distaste for Catholicism." (p. 474) Although he rejects the notion of a "Masonic conspiracy to adopt the idea of separation," Hamburger does estimate the number of Mason
Justices at no fewer than seven. (p. 451 & n.l46) Nonetheless, it is impossible to identify
the Supreme Court of this era with an exclusively nativist program, see West Virginia Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); id at 643-44 (Black, J., concurring) (relying
primarily on a religious-freedom rationale); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Hamburger makes no such claim.
43. Illinois ex rei. McCollum v. Board of Educ. of Sch. Dist. No. 71, 333 U.S. 203,
209-12 (1948) (invalidating a public school program that set aside time during the school
day for students to attend religious instruction delivered by private parties on school
grounds, with parental consent).
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ration rhetoric was apparently not at its peak in 1791, and some
disreputable characters invoked the slogan thereafter. In certain
respects, a principle of church-state separation might also be undermined by Hamburger's research, assuming it is sensible to inquire whether that concept comports with founding era understandings and subsequent tradition. The precise content of any
separation principle, however, is open to serious debate both in
its historical and contemporary forms. Neither Separation the
book nor "separation" the concept can provide terribly precise
guidance about whether any one rule or agenda is implied or appropriate.
Where, then, should this lead constitutional law? Perhaps
nowhere at all, or perhaps to a point already reached by the judiciary. For the Supreme Court at least, the metaphor of "separation" has recently but certainly declined in prevalence. It
seems to have been a decade since even a concurring opinion invoked the separation slogan in a positive light,44 and longer since
a majority signed on.45 That rhetoric is essentially left to dissents.46
Moreover, separation has not been an obviously outcomedeterminative principle in litigation, regardless of what Everson
might have intimated. Absent separation rhetoric, the Court still
enforces government limits with reference to the establishment
clause. 47 Even Lemon v. Kurtzman, 48 which may be viewed as
44. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599-601 & n.l (1992) (Biackmun, J., concurring).
Justice Blackmun's concurrence was joined by Justices Stevens and O'Connor, but the
latter has not shown interest in promoting the phrase since, and she authored an opinion
that reworked Lemon's entanglement prong. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233 (1997)
("Interaction between church and state is inevitable .... ").
45. See Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 339 (1987) (an exemption for religious organizations inTitle VII did not "impermissibly entangle(] church and state; the statute effectuates a more
complete separation of the two"); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 123 (1982)
("Some limited and incidental entanglement between church and state authority is inevitable in a complex modem society, but the concept of a 'wall' of separation is a useful
signpost.") (citations omitted); cf. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) ("The
concept of a 'wall' of separation is a useful figure of speech .... But the metaphor itself is
not a wholly accurate description of the practical aspects of the relationship that in fact
exists .... "); Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687,
696-98 (1994) (plurality opinion of Souter, J.) (discussing impermissible fusion of governmental and religious functions, but not invoking the separation metaphor and invalidating a "separate" school district).
46. E.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2485 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793,873 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
47. Santa Fe lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); Grumet, 512 U.S. at 70910; Lee, 505 U.S. at 599. Granted, when judged by its agenda and judgments, the sympathies of the current Court usually rest more with the government and the religious faithful. See Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2473; Good News Club v. Milford Centr. Sch., 533 U.S. 98,
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the epitome of segarationism, survives the late demise of the
separation slogan. And Everson itself is the best evidence that
the converse is also true: the Court can say it stands ready to ensure church-state "separation" and nevertheless permit government action that benefits religious institutions or individuals.
Consider as well McDaniel v. Paty, 50 in which the Court invalidated a state's exclusion of clergy from the role of constitutional
convention delegate. Despite a related historical lineage dating
to the founding, a rather literal relationship with a separation
program, and an apparently positive reference to separation in
the decision, 51 time and modern constitutional law had passed
these exclusions by, and the Court acted accordingly. Separation
rhetoric and principle guaranteed neither the implementation of
every conceivable component of a program for church-state disconnection, nor the insulation of public policy from religious influence and experience. 52
Judicial tendencies aside, there are several defensible
grounds for rejecting a constitutional principle of separation.
Perhaps "separation of church and state" is so imprecise that it
cannot be useful in deciding real controversies. 53 Or, the term
might now be misleading considering the results in recent cases.
Or, perhaps there is a competing, superseding, or otherwise superior principle with which to begin establishment clause analysis. None of these grounds, however, depend upon which groups
or individuals bandied the phrase in the past nor whether they
harbored illicit motives.
To be sure, revulsion is an understandable consequence of
learning that one's principle looks a lot like the rhetoric of hatefu1 bigots. And the connection, even if logically strained, can be
cause for caution. If nothing else, there is the risk that an otherwise helpfu1 term will be mistaken for code and a spiteful
102 (2001); Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 801 (plurality opinion of Thomas, J.); Agostini, 521 U.S.
at 208-09; Capitol Sq. Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 770 (1995) (plurality opinion of Scalia, J.); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
845-46 (1995); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sck Dist, 509 U.S. 1, 3 (1993); Lamb's
Chapelv. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394-95 (1993).
48. 403 U.S. 602,612-14 (1971).
49. See Doe, 530 U.S. at 314.
50. 435 u.s. 618 (1978).
51. See id at 622 (plurality opinion of Burger, C.J.) (asserting that "[t]he purpose
of the several States in providing for disqualification was primarily to assure the success
of a new political experiment, the separation of church and state").
52. See also Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,312 (1952).
53. The Court has intermittently sent that message for decades. See, e.g., Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,672-73 (1984); Illinois ex rei. McCollum v. Board of Educ. of Sch.
Dist. No. 71,333 U.S. 203,212-13 (1948) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
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agenda. But there is a cost to reticence, too. Removing words
and their images from our constitutional vocabulary can hinder
communication, understanding, and problem solving. Attempts
to partner separation and hate, moreover, will be beside the
point for anyone willing and able to evaluate ideas and their
ramifications without binding them down to the agenda of those
who have mouthed the words in the past. Finally, consider the
alternative: disavowing terminology or even ideas, no matter
how useful, if invoked by otherwise repugnant movements or
groups. It is worth remembering that new Klan members
pledged themselves to freedom of speech and press as well as
church-state separation and white supremacy. (p. 409) And of
course there is no guarantee that religious exercise in the public
sphere would remain untouched by analogous taint. After all,
politicians like George Wallace fought to keep God's Word, but
only one color of His children, in Alabama's finest public
schools. 54
Any effort to preserve the viability of a separation principle
rests on an important assumption, however: that a program of
religion- or church-state "separation" can be constructed free
from prohibited anti-religious or anti-Catholic features, while
still so related to common use of the term that the label is useful.
In other words, it must be logically, conceptually possible to purify the separation principle, to separate separation from hostility. That potential should exist, so long as its meaning does not
solely depend on the term's heritage, but also on the content we
choose to attribute to separation and unacceptable hostility.
Thus "separation of church and state" (or even separation of religion and government) at least means that the two cannot be utterly integrated, which is a conclusion that is not in serious dispute in this country. On the other hand and doctrinally,
separation has never meant that religious practice and belief are
incompatible with American democracy, entailing a faithexpelling final solution. 55 And surely a separation principle can
be fashioned to mean more than the absence of union, less than
expulsion, and not sheer hostility to religious belief and practice.
54. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Philip B. Kurland, The Regents'
Prayer Case: "Full of Sound and Fury, Signifying . .. , "in Philip B. Kurland, ed., Church
and State: The Supreme Court and the First Amendment 3 (U. of Chicago Press, 1975)
(quoting one United States Representative reacting to Engel v. Vitale: "They put the Negroes in to the schools and now they have driven God out of them.").
55. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 7f!J
(1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. f!J2, 614 (1971) ("Some relationship between government and religious organizations is inevitable."); Zorach, 343 U.S. at 312.
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It could mean both a prohibition against tax dollars flowing di-

rectly from government treasuries into the accounts of religious
institutions, yet insulation of those same organizations from
some "neutral" or "generally applicable" secular rules that unduly inhibit their ability to operate as their faith dictates. 56 The
first consequence of this version of the separation principle tends
to disadvantage religious organizations relative to others, at least
in the short run; yet the second consequence has the opposite effect. Whatever its faults, in no sense is this version uniformly
hostile to the interests of religious organizations.
The judiciary may well be free to adopt this or other forms
of "separation," or to select components of an otherwise unacceptable program of church-state separation-and regardless of
how dirty, low-down, and double-dealing were prior proponents
of similar rhetoric. None of this is to say that historical examples
cannot assist our judgment in these matters, of course. But Separation's history need not confine our freedom to decide which
constitutional principles to promote and which consequences
those principles should have.

56. In an exceptionally useful article, Hamburger examines and rejects the evidence
for a founding era general right to religious exemptions from civil laws. Philip Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 915 (1992). In addition, Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. (8 Otto) 145
(1878), which was apparently the first Supreme Court opinion to quote Jefferson's use of
the metaphor, id at 164, did so in denying rather than supporting a faith-based exemption from an anti-polygamy law. But neither history nor precedent prevents us from at
least conceptualizing an alternative principle in tension with either or both.

